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Prologue 
In the Labour Government effort to develop industry during the 1950s in Norway, the 
state owned armament factory at Kongsberg - Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk (KV) - was 
to become Norway’s leader in the development and fabrication of high technology 
products. The politically coordinated modernization effort benefited from generous 
public funding from the US, and was coupled up with technology development efforts 
undertaken at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (NDRE). This 
research institute was a child of the Norwegian integration into US and NATO 
defence structures after the war. During the 1970s, KV had to compete with a small 
start-up firm - Norsk Data - for the position as national leader in the field of digital 
computers. The state owned factory, in spite of special privileges, could not keep up 
with the much smaller rival. In 1987, the Kongsberg firm after years of poor 
economic performance was reorganized and partly privatized. Popular opinion was 
that Goliat had been defeated by David, and the events both on the left and right of 
the policy spectrum were cheered as natural, sensible, and even long overdue.  
10 years later, Norsk Data ran into serious economic problems. The company then 
employed more than 4000 people, but faded quickly. The development and 
production of the Norsk Data brand of computer hardware and software was 
discontinued, and the remains of the once proud firm were bought by Siemens-
Nixdorf, an earlier rival.  
Kongsberg today has an important cluster of high technology firms, and Kongsberg 
Gruppen - which grew out of the former activities of KV - employs more than 4000 
people.1 
* * * 
A few years after Norsk Data started its operations, the state owned industrial firm 
Norsk Hydro established operations in the emerging salmon farming business. Hydro 
Seafood became the world’s largest producer of Atlantic salmon before the end of 
the millennium. Hydro pursued an industrial strategy in order to promote this 
venture, and worked closely with researchers (amongst others at the AKVAFORSK) 
to develop a sustainable competitive advantage based on advanced scientific 
knowledge.  
Hydro, however, was perceived as a Goliat in the aquaculture cluster, which was 
composed of many small firms distributed along the coast. The cluster was 
considered of vital importance for regional development. Local interests lobbied 
effectively against Hydro taking control over the aquaculture cluster, and because 
the State was a majority owner of the firm, such policy priorities could be brought to 
bear on the company strategy. Hydro gave up its ambition of building a major new 
industrial activity based on proprietary technology and the legal protection of its 
intellectual property rights. It sold its aquaculture business to a Dutch firm at the 
end of the millennium, making a hefty profit.  
                                                 
1
 The history of Norwegian minicomputing technology is told in Ørstavik, Finn, The 
hierarchical systems paradigm in technological innovation, Dr. Philos thesis, Oslo: 
The University of Oslo, 1996 
iv 
 
 
At this point, policy makers were indeed unhappy to see such an important part of 
this very promising industry be taken over by foreigners. The criticism of Norsk 
Hydro lack of willingness to protect national ownership in this important industry 
was intense and pervasive.2 
                                                 
2
 The Hydro venture into aquaculture is from a forthcoming paper by Finn Ørstavik on the 
development of the Norwegian aquaculture cluster. Cfr. also Mariussen et al, Innovasjonssystemet i 
Havbruksnæringen, STEP Report 2002, forthcoming 
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 1 
1. Introduction 
Liberal philosophers have a clear position regarding the role of the State in economic 
life: The State should not own, nor run, it should only regulate. It should be the task of 
citizens to run businesses, the function of the State should be to put down the rules of 
the game, and to make framework conditions fair and predictable.  
In real life, government institutions play a significant role in business, both as owners, 
in running operations, and in specifying tailored rules for specific types of businesses. 
Most of the time, people at the government level interact with people from business in 
order to develop rules and regulations in ways that are compatible with the needs of 
business firms, today, and even more importantly, in the future. The relationships 
between the government institutions and the business firms are in reality very 
complex, and far from as impersonal and neutral as liberal philosophy and normative 
economic theory would like them to be. 
Debates on what role the institutions of the Government and the State should play in 
an economy are older than capitalism itself. Such discussions are a key feature of 
sociology, as well as the classical economics concerned with institutions and change. 
This is immediately obvious when the works of Marx, Weber, Schumpeter, Parsons 
and Habermas are considered. To discuss these various theoretical contributions is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Our focus is upon state ownership in a corporate 
governance perspective.  
The term corporate governance has been coined to denote how firms are owned, 
managed and controlled. Corporate governance has become a central issue among 
both politicians and researchers in recent years, reflecting a recognition that the 
ownership and management of firms is of great importance to their economic 
performance. As Tore Sandven has shown in a recent paper, there is a multitude of 
perspectives, theoretical foundations and lines of thinking in today’s corporate 
governance debate.3 Sandven is addressing the specifics in the recent international 
debate and its theoretical underpinnings, and his arguments will not be repeated in any 
detail here. Our starting-point is, however, the view expressed by Sandven that the 
mainstream literature on corporate governance suffers from an overly narrow 
perspective.4 We share this view - not only is the debate too much preoccupied with 
specificities of neoclassical theory. The focus of the debate is also more or less 
exclusively set on private firms, and how their owners are to make sure that managers 
act in accordance to their interests.  
First, the debate has a narrow concept of what a firm is; namely a rational actor with 
qualities making it substantially very similar to the individual conceptualized by 
mainstream economists as economic man. The launching pin of the debate then 
becomes the troubling realization that in economies where firms have their ownership 
split off from the management function, the simple, unitary and rationalistic economic 
                                                 
3
 Sandven, Tore, Corporate Governance: Theoretical Background and Implications for the Analysis of 
Corporate Governance in Norway, STEP Report 2002, forthcoming 
4
 Sandven, Tore, Corporate Governance: Theoretical Background and Implications for the Analysis of 
Corporate Governance in Norway, STEP Report 2002, forthcoming, p. 6 
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2 
model of the firm becomes very unconvincing. The line of thinking addressing the 
issues of corporate governance from this perspective is commonly referred to as the 
maximizing shareholder value model. In its preoccupation with how owners are to 
discipline managers in order to ensure profit maximization, this model neglects the - 
in our view - crucial relationship between innovation and economic performance. 
Second, ownership seems in many analysts’ minds to be synonymous with private 
ownership. It is the division of private, individual owners and managers which is 
discussed. As Trygve Guldbrandsen shows in a recent literature review, state 
companies are in general ignored in the international corporate governance debate.5 
Guldbrandsen finds one notable exception to this rule: Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. 
Vishny do mention state ownership in their review of corporate governance issues.6 
In several countries - among them Norway - state ownership is a salient feature in 
industry. Shleifer and Vishny are aware of the fact, but still treat the issue with less 
rigour than it deserves. In their view, state ownership is simply ‘a manifestation of a 
radical failure of corporate governance.’7 This failure is claimed to have dramatic 
negative consequences for the performance of firms. The authors, however, fail to 
substantiate their claim with any convincing data, and base their judgement instead on 
common-sense considerations regarding the poor economic performance of state 
controlled economic enterprises in the former Soviet Union and other communist 
states.8  
Against this background, the present paper surveys the political and academic debate 
on state ownership in Norway. The structure of the paper is the following: We start, in 
section 2, by showing that state ownership has been substantial in this country since 
the Second World War, and still plays a very important role in the economic life. In 
section 3, we investigate into the recent debate on corporate governance and the 
significance attributed to the role of state ownership in this debate. We stress that the 
issue of how innovation comes about should be given a central place in any serious 
consideration of the relationship between corporate governance and economic 
performance. 
The particular significance of state ownership with respect to innovation will 
elaborated in the concluding section 4. We there argue that a more adequate 
conceptualization of innovation immediately raises interesting questions about 
                                                 
5
 Guldbrandsen, Trygve, Internasjonal forskning om eierskap og kontroll i privat næringsliv, ISF 
Report 99:2, Oslo: Institutt for samfunnsforskning, 1999 
6
 Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W., ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’, in The Journal of Fi-
nance, Vol LII, No 2, June 1997 
7
 Ibid., p. 737 
8
 Ibid, pp. 767-769 
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performance and various forms of ownership and about state ownership in particular. 
In an innovation systems perspective, state and government institutions play a crucial 
role in economic development. This role is not grasped in normative, equilibrium 
oriented neoclassical economic theory, but should be at the core of more evolutionary 
economic analysis.   

 5 
2. Characteristics of state ownership in Norwegian 
industry 
In Norway, state ownership is substantial. There is however a lack of empirical 
knowledge in this area, concerning both the scale and characteristics of such 
ownership, and what significance it might have for economic performance.9 While the 
main aim of this paper is to look into the current Norwegian debate on state 
ownership, we wish to place the debate within an empirical context, and we therefore 
provide a brief survey of what recent literature tells us about the history, motives, 
organisational forms, scale, and general characteristics of this phenomenon.  
History and motives 
In a 2000 FAFO working paper,10 Martin Byrkjeland and Ove Langeland outline the 
historical development of Norwegian state ownership since 1945 with emphasis on 
the motives for the state acting as an industrial owner. While maintaining that the 
motives are varied and have changed over time, the authors conclude that motives can 
be said to mainly belong to three broad categories: Control, market failure, and 
industrial policy.11 
State ownership has been a central feature in Norwegian industry since the Second 
World War. Although the State owned industrial enterprises in earlier times as well, 
these were mainly companies of strategic importance to the country’s defence and 
infrastructure. According to Byrkjeland and Langeland, the main motives behind the 
increase in state ownership after the war were the need for industrial development in a 
situation where private capital was scarce, and the ambition to secure national control 
of central natural resources. In addition, the development must be seen in the context 
of the ideology of the Labour Party governments which were in power from 1945 to 
1963. The overriding ambition of these governments was to modernize the country 
and increase welfare through promoting industrial development.12 
On the whole, there was a weakening of the State’s role as an industrial owner in the 
1960s. The decade saw several industrial scandals - the first of which was related to 
the Kings Bay incident in 1962 - which made state ownership a much debated issue. 
However, Byrkjeland and Langeland point out that a trend in the direction of reducing 
state direct industrial involvement had been under way before these scandals 
occurred. This point also shows that the development can not be exclusively attributed 
to the Labour Party’s loss of power in this decade. Byrkjeland and Langeland argue 
                                                 
9
 Byrkjeland, Martin and Langeland, Ove, State ownership in Norway 1945-2000, 
FAFO working paper 2000:22, FAFO, 2000, p. 84; Bøhren, Øyvind and Ødegaard, 
Bernt Arne, Norsk eierskap: Særtrekk og sære trekk, Department of Financial 
Economics, Norwegian School of Management BI, April 24, 2002,  p. 3 
10
 Byrkjeland, Martin and Langeland, Ove, State ownership in Norway 1945-2000, FAFO working 
paper 2000:22, FAFO, 2000 
11
 Ibid., p. 78 
12
 Ibid., pp. 27-34 
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6 
that state ownership was never a goal in itself for the Labour Party. In spite of an 
overall reduction, the State according to the authors still owned and controlled a 
substantial part of Norwegian industry in the 1960s. In addition to the continuation of 
the mentioned modernization strategy, Byrkjeland and Langeland stress that state 
ownership in this decade was mainly motivated by regional policy concerns.13 
During the 1970s there was a more than tenfold increase in state industrial 
investments. 14 A major reason for this was the discovery of oil in the North Sea and 
the Government ambition to develop an autonomous Norwegian capacity in off-shore 
technology, research and industry. A key concern in this connection was national 
control of the country’s natural resources. But beyond this, the effort was led by 
people that during the whole post-World War II period had worked to develop 
advanced technology industry and research in Norway. Men such as Finn Lied 
(director of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, and Minister of Industry 
in the Labour Government led by Trygve Bratteli, 1971-1972), and Jens Christian 
Hauge played essential roles. They wanted to use the discovery of petroleum 
resources strategically, intensifying Labour efforts to develop Norwegian industry and 
Norwegian technological and scientific research.15 
The emergence of Norway as a major oil and gas producer thus coincided with 
Labour efforts to use the State, and state ownership, strategically to promote radical 
institutional and industrial innovation. The ultimate goal was to achieve the 
modernization of the economy that had been a coveted policy goal since Labour first 
took government power. The petroleum resources gave completely new opportunities 
to develop both industry and research, and ‘the market’ was not trusted with the task 
of achieving such goals. Lied, Bratteli, Hauge and others oversaw a comprehensive 
institutional build-up, on the level of Government, as well as in the industry, where 
the whole state owned company Statoil was given a pivotal role to play. 16 
The state owned industrial activities of the 1970s in other areas than the emerging 
petroleum sector, such as in electronics and other high tech fields, resulted for a large 
part in substantial economic losses. This clearly generated support for increased 
privatization, which has been a salient trend both internationally and in Norway in the 
1980s and 1990s. While ascribing to the Conservative Party - who came to power in 
1981 - a central role in this development, Byrkjeland and Langeland stress that the 
Labour Party had signalled a re-orientation towards increased privatization even 
earlier. Byrkjeland and Langeland argue that a rather ambivalent picture of the State’s 
role in industry has emerged in Norway in the last two decades. Against the clear 
trend towards increased privatization and deregulation - illustrated for example by the 
part privatization of Telenor and Statoil - stands the fact that state ownership is still 
substantial. In certain industries, the involvement of the State has increased. This is 
true for the banking industry, where the severe crisis in the late 1980s resulted in 
substantial investments by the State. Thus, as Byrkjeland and Langeland point out, 
state ownership can in some cases be seen in the context of the state acting as a 
                                                 
13
 Ibid., pp. 35-42 
14
 Ibid., pp. 43-59 
15
 Cfr. Ørstavik, Finn: The hierarchical systems paradigm in technological innovation. Dr. Philos. 
thesis, The University of Oslo, 1996; chapter 12. 
16
 Ibid. The developments have been further analyzed for instance in Hanisch, Tore Jørgen og Nerheim, 
Gunnar 1992: Norsk oljehistorie. Bind 1. Oslo: Leseselskapet - Norsk Petroleumsforening. 
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‘saviour’ in times of crisis. Securing national ownership is still a central motive, as is 
securing long term strategic ownership.17 
Organizational forms 
State industrial holdings are organized in several different ways. A report prepared by 
Statskonsult in 1998 18 elaborates on the different organizational forms. The report 
divides state holdings into three main categories: Administrative agencies,19 state 
owned companies, and foundations.20 The categories reflect differences in the formal 
relations between the State and the enterprise, and hence in the State’s possibilities for 
control and the enterprise’s freedom of action. Statskonsult’s report focuses upon the 
organizational forms in which business considerations are the most prominent. These 
include state owned companies - covering wholly owned state companies, part owned 
joint stock companies, state enterprises, and special-law firms - and to a lesser degree 
administration companies - a sub-category of administrative agencies.21 
Wholly owned state companies are joint stock companies in which the State owns all 
shares. The companies are independent legal entities. The mechanisms for state 
control in these companies include the function of the responsible Minister as the 
general meeting and the appointment of the administrative agencies. State control is 
however to be limited to overriding issues, such as the companies’ areas of operation 
and dividends.22 
Part owned joint stock companies are ordinary joint stock companies in which the 
State is part-owner. In these companies, the State has the same possibilities for control 
as the private owners, the main control mechanism being the general meeting.23 
State enterprises are fully state-owned businesses where the objective is to realize 
some form of sector policy objective. The companies include power networks, 
property companies (owning science parks, business sites and infrastructure), state 
forestry resources, and so on. State enterprises are independent legal entities, which 
are run by a company board and a managing director. The topmost controlling powers 
are held by the State, and exerted through the general meeting.24 
Special-law firms are companies established through individual acts of Parliament, 
usually in order to secure state control over some activity for broad public policy 
reasons. They include the railways, the post office, the state industrial bank, the 
                                                 
17
 Ibid., pp. 61-75 
18
 Statskonsult, I godt selskap? Statlig eierstyring i teori og praksis, Report 1998:21, 
Statskonsult, 1998 
19
 forvaltningsorganer 
20
 stiftelser 
21
 Statskonsult, I godt selskap? Statlig eierstyring i teori og praksis, Report 1998:21, Statskonsult, 
1998, pp. 18-20 
22
 Ibid., pp. 19-20 
23
 Ibid., p. 23 
24
 Ibid., pp. 20-21 
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organization for sale of wines and spirits, and a gambling operation. The companies 
are independent legal entities, and are run according to their respective special laws.25 
Administration companies in the main provide business-oriented services related to 
marketing, safety regulation, export finance, and so on. The argument is that these are 
activities which are difficult to undertake in an effective and advantageous manner in 
the market. They are directly administered by the Government. They fall under the 
purview of the Council of the Ministers26, their accounts are made public and they are 
part of the public administration structure. They include the air traffic control service, 
a state mapping service, and so on.27 
Scale 
Although Norwegian industry is characterized by a substantial degree of state 
ownership, we lack precise knowledge of the scale and distribution of state holdings. 
The estimates that do exist, for one thing generally concern public ownership - that is 
the holdings of regional28 as well as state authorities. Secondly, the figures on the 
present situation vary, reflecting the fact that different actors base their estimates on 
different - and often poorly documented - data and methodology.  
In an article published in 2002, Knut H. Jellum of the Norwegian Financial Services 
Association (FNH) presents figures on the value of public ownership in the period 
1999-2001.29 Jellum’ s definition of public ownership includes all public industrial 
holdings except in the primary sector and housing property. For listed firms, he bases 
his estimates on stock value, while the value of public holdings in non-listed firms are 
estimated on the basis of varying - and unspecified - data. Tables 2.1. and 2.2. are 
based on Jellum’s findings. 
Table 2.1. The value of public ownership 1999-2001, in billion Norwegian kroner 
(NOK) 
 1999 2000 2001 
LISTED FIRMS 98,2 156,9 289,2 
NON-LISTED 
FIRMS 
815,2 788,6 564,9 
TOTAL  913,4 945,5 854,1 
TOTAL, EXCEPT 470,9 424,2 429,4 
                                                 
25
 Ibid., p. 22 
26
 statsråd 
27
 Statskonsult, I godt selskap? Statlig eierstyring i teori og praksis, Report 1998:21, Statskonsult, 
1998, pp. 18-19 
28
 Including county (fylkeskommune) and municipality (kommune). 
29
 Jellum, Knut H., ‘Utviklingen i offentlig eierskap i Norge og andre land’, Horisont, No 3/2002, 
Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry (NHO): Oslo, 2002 
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OIL 
 
Source: Jellum, Knut H., ‘Utviklingen i offentlig eierskap i Norge og andre land’, Horisont, 
No 3/2002, Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry (NHO): Oslo, 2002, p. 15 
Comments: The figures are as of the 31st of December for each year. 
According to table 2.1, the value of public ownership in the period 1999-2001 was on 
average approximately 900 billion NOK. Non-listed firms represented the largest 
values in absolute terms. However, these values decreased over the period in question, 
while the values in listed firms increased substantially. This development must be 
understood in the context of the above mentioned part-privatization of the large and 
traditionally wholly state owned companies Telenor and Statoil.  
Table 2.1 also shows, that the scale of Norwegian public ownership for a large part is 
related to the country’s oil resources. We observe that when oil related public 
ownership is excluded, the scale is reduced by almost 50%. 
Table 2.2. The share of public ownership 1999-2001, in percent 
 1999 2000 2001 
LISTED FIRMS 16,9 24,6 38,2 
INDUSTRY AS A WHOLE 54,2 49,9 45,8 
INDUSTRY AS A WHOLE, EXCEPT 
OIL 
45,3 37,4 36,1 
 
Source: Jellum, Knut H., ‘The developments in public ownership in Norway and other 
countries’, Horisont, No 3/2002, Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry (NHO): Oslo, 
2002, p. 15 
Comment: The figures are as of the 31st of December for each year. 
Table 2.2 shows, that while the share of Norwegian industry owned by the public 
decreased between 1999 and 2001, the public ownership share in listed firms 
increased. Again, the developments reflect the stock-exchange listing and part-
privatization of Telenor and Statoil. 
In addition to Jellum, ECON economist Audun Gleinsvik has estimated the scale of 
public ownership in Norway in recent years. His figures are presented in the book The 
Problem of Wealth (in Norwegian, Rikdommens Problem), which was published in 
2001.30 Gleinsvik limits public ownership to commercially oriented enterprises, 
excluding - on the basis of subjective judgement - enterprises in which non-business-
oriented objectives are prominent.31 Table 2.3 reproduces Gleinsvik’s estimates on the 
                                                 
30
 Roland, Kjell, Norman, Victor D., and Reve, Torger (eds.), Rikdommens Problem, Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget, 2001 
31
 The following publicly owned enterprises are excluded: Statens kartverk, Forsvarets 
bygningstjeneste, Kings Bay AS, Forbrukerkontakt AS, Norsk Film AS, Norsk Rikskringkasting AS, 
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scale and distribution of public ownership in the period 1999-2000. The estimates are 
based on a combination of real market values, estimated market values and book 
values. 
Table 2.3. Public ownership in industry, in million NOK 
COMPANY VALUE 
SDØE 238 800 
STATOIL 139 000 
TELENOR 51 517 
STATKRAFT 38 500 
STATSBYGG 12 327 
ENTRA EIENDOM 3 500 
LUFTFARTSVERKET 10 919 
NSB 8 700 
STATNETT 25 000 
POSTEN BA 3 200 
CERMAQ (TIDLIGERE STATKORN 
HOLDING) 
2 800 
NMD 492 
STATSBANKENE 6 095 
FOLKETRYGDFONDET 21 037 
OTHER INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 231 227 
TOTAL 794 113 
 
                                                                                                                                            
NSB Gardermobanen AS, Statsskog, Store Norske Spitsbergen Kullkompani AS, Vinmonopolet AS, in 
addition to theatres and various companies in Svalbard. 
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Source: The table is based on Gleinsvik’s table 8.1, in Gleinsvik, Audun, ‘Omfanget av offentlig 
eierskap i Norge’, Roland, Kjell, Norman, Victor D., and Reve, Torger (eds.), Rikdommens Problem, 
Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2001, p. 174 
According to Gleinsvik’s calculations, the total value of public ownership amounts to 
about 800 billion NOK - significantly less than Jellum’s average of 900 billion. This 
indicates that the concept of state ownership in Norwegian industry is less 
straightforward than one might expect, and that quantifying this kind of ownership 
depends on a number of assumptions and approximations. 
Further, table 2.3. confirms the central role of oil in Norwegian public ownership: 
SDØE32 - which manages the Norwegian Government’s oil and gas portfolio - and the 
oil company Statoil are by far the two largest individual public holdings.  
Gleinsvik also presents figures on the relative shares of public and private ownership 
in Norwegian industry. These figures, which are based on book values, are reproduced 
in table 2.4.  
Table 2.4. Public and private ownership shares, 1998 
 VALUE (IN BILLION 
NOK) 
PERCENTAGE 
TOTAL 1151,8 100 
PUBLIC 409,0 35,5 
PRIVATE 742,8 64,5 
 
Source: The table is based on Gleinsvik’s table 8.2, in Gleinsvik, Audun, ‘Omfanget av 
offentlig eierskap i Norge’, Roland, Kjell, Norman, Victor D., and Reve, Torger (eds.), Rikdommens 
Problem, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2001, p. 176 
Comment:  Public ownership includes state and municipal ownership. Private ownership includes 
Norwegian private ownership and foreign ownership. 
We observe that Gleinsvik’s percentual estimate is fairly close to Jellum’s estimates 
on public ownership shares in industry excluding oil, over the period 1999-2001- see 
table 2.2. 
In the spring of 2002, the centre-right coalition government published a White Paper 
on state industrial ownership, entitled Reduced and improved ownership.33 There, the 
total value of public ownership is estimated to be 842 billion NOK as of the end of 
2001, amounting to 42% of total values in industry.34 The White Paper’s lack of any 
further information as to the scale and distribution of state ownership in general, 
seems to confirm that we as of today are in want of precise knowledge in this area.  
                                                 
32
 SDØE was in 2001 re-named Petoro. 
33
 White Paper No 22 (2001-2002), Reduced and improved state ownership (in Norwegian, Et mindre 
og bedre statlig eierskap) 
34
 Ibid., p. 17 
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The White Paper does however present more detailed figures on the scale of state 
ownership in firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) - that is in ordinary joint 
stock companies in which the State holds shares. The estimate of the State’s share of 
total OSE values in the period 1994-2001 is approximately 15%.35 This estimate 
seems to be accordance with the findings of Øyvind Bøhren and Bernt Arne Ødegaard 
in their project on corporate governance at the Department of Financial Economics, 
Norwegian School of Management BI. The project - which was started in 1998 - 
focuses upon OSE listed firms in the period 1989-1997. In this period, the aggregate 
holdings of the State are estimated to amount to 18% of total values.36 Through their 
project, Bøhren and Ødegaard have produced valuable data on the ownership structure 
in Norwegian listed firms. Their results with regards to the characteristics of state 
ownership are presented below.  
With a state ownership share in listed firms of approximately 15-18% in the 1990s, 
Norway stands out in comparison with other advanced capitalist economies. 
According to the White Paper, state ownership shares in European countries, USA 
and Japan were on average less than 10% in the period 1994-1999. In this period, the 
Norwegian share was only matched by that of Finland (approximately 17%) and Italy 
(approximately 23%).37 In this connection it is worth noticing that the Norwegian 
State’s share of total OSE values had increased to 37,4% by the end of 2001. In the 
White Paper, this increase is ascribed to the aforementioned stock-exchange listing of 
Telenor in 2000 and of Statoil in 2001.38 Norway’s dominant position is explained by 
the fact that the State owns substantial parts of a limited number of really large 
companies. These companies, and the state’s respective ownership shares (as of 
2002), are presented in table 2.5. 
Table 2.5. Large state industrial holdings, 2002 
COMPANY STATE OWNERSHIP SHARE 
(%) 
STATOIL  81,78 
TELENOR 77,68 
RAUFOSS 50,27 
KONGSBERG 
GRUPPEN 
50,001 
DNB 47,3 
                                                 
35
 Ibid., p. 18 
36
 Bøhren, Øyvind and Ødegaard, Bernt Arne, Norsk eierskap: Særtrekk og sære trekk, 
Department of Financial Economics, Norwegian School of Management BI, April 24, 
2002, p. 7 
37
 White Paper No 22 (2001-2002), Reduced and improved state ownership, p. 18 
38
 Ibid., p. 18 
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NORSK HYDRO 43,82 
 
Source: White Paper No 22 (2001-2002), Reduced and improved state ownership, p. 20 
Statoil, Telenor, DnB and Norsk Hydro are four out of the five largest companies in 
OSE, which together represent almost 50% of the OSE’s total market capitalization.39 
General characteristics 
The corporate governance project run by Bøhren and Ødegaard at BI, has provided 
valuable insights into the characteristics of state ownership in publicly listed firms. On 
the grounds that there exist little systemized knowledge on Norwegian ownership, the 
project has inquired into owner types and ownership concentration in all firms listed 
on the Oslo Stock Exchange over the period 1987-1997. State ownership is one of the 
five owner types that are identified, the others being international, institutional 
(financial), personal, and industrial ownership.40 
As pointed out above, Bøhren and Ødegaard find that the State’s ownership share in 
the period in question is 18% of total OSE values. This place state ownership as more 
substantial than personal ownership, equal to institutional ownership, but more limited 
than international and industrial ownership respectively.41 They also find that state 
ownership is more prominent in certain industries and certain types of companies than 
others. While state ownership is almost absent within shipping and small and medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs), it is substantial within manufacturing industry and finance.42 
When it comes to ownership concentration, Bøhren and Ødegaard come to the general 
conclusion that the largest owner tend to be small, but that the second and third largest 
owners are relatively large.43 With regards to state ownership, they find that the State 
is generally underrepresented among the largest owners. Hence, they point to a 
tendency for the state to be an anonymous owner.44 In addition to being anonymous -
                                                 
39
 Ibid., p. 20 
40
 Bøhren, Øyvind and Ødegaard, Bernt Arne, Norsk eierskap: Særtrekk og sære trekk, Department of 
Financial Economics, Norwegian School of Management BI, April 24, 2002, p. 7 
41
 Ibid., p. 7 
42
 Ibid., pp. 7-9 
43
 Ibid., p. 15 
44
 Ibid., p. 17 
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meaning small, the State is generally said to be a passive owner. This point is e.g. 
made by Byrkjeland and Langeland, who also point to the general tendency for the 
State to be an owner with a long term perspective, emphasizing value creation over 
time.45 The picture of state ownership drawn up by Byrkjeland and Langeland, as well 
as other researchers will be presented further in the next section, on the Norwegian 
debate on state ownership. 
                                                 
45
 Byrkjeland, Martin and Langeland, Ove, ‘State ownership in Norway 1945-2000’, FAFO 2000:22, 
pp. 79, 81 
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3. The Norwegian debate on state ownership 
A pertinent, but basic observation about the debate on state ownership in Post World 
War II Norway is that it has been going on more or less uninterruptedly. To a large 
part, the debate has been shaped by particular events (such as the King’s Bay affair) 
and the balance of political power. For several decades, the leading force in 
Norwegian politics was the Labour Party, and the debate in these years was 
structured along a right-left axis. The socialists wanted state ownership as part of a 
policy oriented towards a planning and rational Government, while conservatives and 
liberals opposed and feared these efforts. However, Labour very early on 
compromised with respect to the more radical ideas about planned economy and 
government control. Still, activities to build a strong, technologically savvy industry 
in a setting where Government was involved ‘on all sides of the table’ went on well 
into the 1970s.46  
There is no need to go into the details of the specificities of the debate over the very 
long period it has been going on. What we wish to do here is to look into the debate 
as it is shaped today. Even with this limitation in mind, we do not wish to develop a 
comprehensive analysis with respect to all available literature, nor the details of the 
complete political debate. What we have done, is a to make a quite narrow selection 
of contributions that we find are essential to grasp what has been going on and what 
have been the key themes.  
We do distinguish between academic and political debate, and start out with the 
latter. We also have chosen to start out with a synthetic presentation of the view on 
state ownership of the aforementioned scholars Shleifer and Vishny. Their view, 
which is strongly coloured by the line of thinking we have termed the maximizing 
shareholder value model, serves very well as a backdrop that makes it significantly 
easier to characterize the various contributions to the debate that we analyse in the 
following. 
Shleifer and Vishny’s view on state ownership 
According to Shleifer and Vishny ‘corporate governance deals with the ways in 
which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on 
their investments.’47 The central issue in their approach is the agency problem - the 
                                                 
46
 see Slagstad, Rune, De nasjonale strateger, Oslo: Pax forlag, 1998; see also Ørstavik, Finn, 
Engineers as masterbuilders of society. Technology creation and institution building at the Norwegian 
Defense Research Establishment through 2 decades, Magister Artium thesis in sociology, 
Oslo: University of Oslo, 1989 and Ørstavik, Finn, The hierarchical systems paradigm 
in technological innovation, Dr. Philos thesis, Oslo: The University of Oslo, 1996, 
for analyses of the innovation system building which happened around the 
Norwegian Defence Research Establishment and Institute for Atomic Energy 
47
 Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W., ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’, in The Journal of 
Finance, Vol LII, No 2, June 1997, p. 737 
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problem that the managers of a corporation do not necessarily act in accordance with 
the owners’ interest in maximizing profits.  
A common argument in favour of state ownership is that there is a need to secure 
social welfare, and that such welfare concerns may not be addressed by firms which 
are run according to the principle of profit-maximization. An example of this would 
be supply of water and electricity, which many would claim should be provided by 
the State on a non-profit basis, and not by individual firms striving to maximize their 
profits. Shleifer and Vishny agree to the validity of this argument. However, they 
maintain that in reality, state companies do not live up to the demands put on them in 
this respect. Quite contrary to the substance of the welfare argument, state companies 
frequently disregard broader welfare concerns. Not only are the objectives pursued 
by these firms narrow and related to firm specific issues, also the core of these 
narrow issues are disregarded, as state companies in general are extremely 
inefficient. Thus, state ownership cannot be justified on the grounds of social 
welfare.48 
The alleged weaknesses of state companies are explained by their deviation from the 
principle that the control of a company should be vested in the hands of its owners. 
While state companies in theory are owned by the taxpaying public, they are 
controlled by bureaucrats. Hence the companies are run according to the goals of 
bureaucrats, which in Shleifer and Vishny’s opinion are neither social welfare nor 
maximizing profits. Bureaucrats are first of all inclined to pursue their own political 
interests, such as securing votes by catering for the interests of special interest groups 
- i.e. public employee trade unions, who ‘not surprisingly typically strongly support 
state ownership.’49  
Thus, a basic general observation about typical state firms, such as public 
waterworks, electricity providers, telephone companies and transport companies, is 
that their operations are more concerned with making the working days easier for 
employees, the workplaces secure, and the managerial scope of leaders as big as 
possible, than to serve their clients as well and as efficiently as possible. Shleifer and 
Vishny appear to think that these observations are so obvious that they do not need to 
be substantiated by facts. And maybe they are? Their view is - irrespectively of the 
lack of factual proof - widely shared. And their conclusion with respect to the 
observed inefficiencies is in any case uncontroversial: ‘The recognition of enormous 
inefficiency of state firms, and the pressure on state budgets, has created a common 
response around the world in the last few years, namely privatization.’ 
How then does the Norwegian debate on state ownership stand out against this 
background? The international wave of privatization Shleifer and Vishny point to 
holds true for Norway. As mentioned in section 2, the country has seen an emerging 
trend towards state divestiture and privatization in the last two decades. According to 
Bøhren and Ødegaard, this trend reflects that it is a widely held view among both 
politicians and the public that private ownership is more conducive to value creation 
than state ownership.50 That there is scepticism with respect to the efficiency of state 
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 Ibid., p. 768 
50
 Bøhren, Øyvind and Ødegaard, Bernt Arne, Norsk eierskap: Særtrekk og sære 
trekk, Department of Financial Economics, Norwegian School of Management BI, 
April 24, 2002, pp. 2, 4 
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owned firms does not, however, mean that there is a general opposition to state 
ownership altogether. It is a common view that the Norwegian State can and should 
safeguard social welfare concerns, also by acting as an owner of companies when 
this is appropriate. The differences of opinion, and hence the debate, relate to the 
following two issues: (1) to what extent the State should be an industrial owner; and 
(2) how the State in practice should approach the issue of governance within its 
holdings. 
This holds for the political debate, as well as for the more academic and scholarly 
debate. In the following, we first focus on the former. We address the recent debate 
by way of a content analysis of the current Government’s White Paper on ownership, 
and on an analysis of the reactions to this paper. We demonstrate that the debate 
follows traditional ideological differences along the left-right axis in the political 
system.  
The scholarly debate is analysed in the ensuing section 3.3 of this chapter.  
The political debate on state ownership 
  
The title of the aforementioned White Paper Reduced and improved ownership 
published by the present Government (2002), in a telling way strikes a balance 
between opposing views on state ownership: In addition to signalling that the 
Government is concerned with state ownership and its potential inefficiency, the title 
at the same time indicates that the Government is in favour of keeping some level of 
state involvement on the owner side.51 Reducing the State’s role as an industrial 
owner is important, but there are instances where state ownership is still called for. In 
these cases, the objective must be to make the State a better owner. 
The main argument for reducing state ownership is that the ever more important 
trend towards globalization increasingly puts pressures on firms and organizations to 
be flexible in their response to changing framework conditions and increased 
competition. This first and foremost creates a need for a more competent and active 
ownership. The government believes that private owners have a better capacity to 
meet these needs, and to act as good owners, than the State.52 Thus, good ownership 
is explicitly associated with private ownership. The White Paper refers to the agency 
problem as a theoretical basis for this view. It argues that private ownership implies a 
more direct line of control between owners and management than institutional - 
including state - ownership. Hence, private ownership is seen as more conducive to 
firms being run according to the profit-maximizing interests of the owners, and 
therefore also to value creation.53 
Against this background, the Government argues that state ownership should be 
limited to companies with key functions relating to administrative and political goals, 
e.g. the exploitation of natural resources for the common good, the development and 
maintenance of infrastructure, the strengthening of national R&D activities, the 
                                                 
51
 This reflects that the Government is a coalition, but also that the Conservative party traditionally 
has been in favour of state ownership in particular cases.  
52
 White Paper No 22 (2001-2002), Reduced and improved state ownership, p. 6 
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securing of social welfare, etc.54 However, the White Paper stresses that in many 
cases, such goals can be addressed just as efficiently through laws, concessions, etc. - 
that is, by the State acting as a regulator. The argument is that whenever this is the 
case, the State should prefer the role as regulator to that as industrial owner.55  
The clarification of the objectives of - and alternatives to - state ownership, is by the 
Government meant to provide a basis for continually assessing the State’s role as an 
industrial owner. Where such a role is called for, the White Paper stresses the need to 
improve the organization and administration of state ownership. The aim is to make 
the State both a more legitimate and a more professional and effective owner. In this 
connection, great emphasis is placed upon drawing a clear line between the State’s 
parallel functions as owner and as regulator. One way of doing this, would be to 
concentrate state ownership in one Ministry. In addition to providing a clearer 
separation of ownership and regulation responsibilities respectively, such a 
concentration could potentially make ownership more efficient. The administration 
of several companies which are partly or wholly owned by the State has already been 
concentrated in the Ministry of Industry and Trade,56 and the Government 
recommends that this trend be continued.57  
The White Paper also expresses the view that state ownership in general should be 
administered according to the same principles as private ownership. Against this 
background, it presents ten principles for good state ownership. These include that 
shareholders are to be treated equally; that there should be openness with regards to 
state ownership; that the general meeting should be the forum for ownership 
decisions; that the State is to decide upon goals, while the board is responsible for 
realizing these goals; that there should be wage- and incentive-schemes conducive to 
value creation, etc.58 
As mentioned earlier, the widely held positive view on private ownership in Norway 
which Bøhren and Ødegaard point to,59 does not imply that there is a general 
consensus regarding the need to reduce state ownership. Opinions differ on the extent 
to which the State should be an industrial owner. In the political debate, these 
differences seem to a large degree to be ideologically founded. The view of the 
present Government can be understood in the context of its centre-right position in 
Norwegian politics, and not least the dominant position of the Conservative party. A 
few years ago, this party’s liberal stance against state ownership was strongly 
expressed in the report Statlig eiermakt i norsk næringsliv.60 As is shown by the 
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 Ibid., pp. 6, 44-46 
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reactions to the Government’s White Paper in Parliament and LO, the political left 
holds a much more positive view on state ownership. The majority in Parliament did 
not support the Government’s ambition to reduce state ownership. The parliamentary 
debates over the White Paper clearly show that the parties to the political left hold a 
radically different opinion on both the need for, and the efficiency of state 
ownership.  
Although stressing that it is not against reduced state ownership in principle, the 
Labour Party (AP) argues in favour of a continued substantial state ownership. Its 
main argument is that state ownership is of crucial importance if we wish to secure 
national ownership, and hence, good and interesting jobs for the present population 
as well as an income base for future generations. With increasing globalization, state 
ownership is seen as the only way of guaranteeing national ownership in the small 
and open Norwegian economy where private ownership milieus are limited. Also, 
AP believes the State to be a good industrial owner, and stress that history has 
proved state ownership to be efficient and conducive to a positive industrial 
development. 61 
The Socialist Left Party (SV) also argues in favour of a continued strong state 
ownership by referring to the need to secure national industrial ownership. In 
addition, this party stresses the relationship between innovation and economic 
performance. The Government is accused of believing that increased competition and 
private ownership in itself will promote industrial development. Hence, the crucial 
importance of factors such as competence building and the ability to innovate is 
ignored. It is argued that if we view economic performance in an innovation 
perspective, the need for private ownership becomes less clear - state ownership may 
e.g. be conducive to long term future oriented competence building. However, SV’s 
arguments are fairly theoretical, and not substantiated by concrete examples.62 
The reaction of the majority of Parliament to the Government’s White Paper was 
approved by LO - the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unionswho sees it as a 
clear statement in favour of a continued strong state ownership and as a victory for 
those who appreciate the social value of the State acting as an industrial owner. 
Reflecting the stance of the Labour Party, LO is not opposed to reducing state 
ownership per se but stresses the importance of state ownership as an instrument to 
secure national ownership. LO also shares AP’s view that the State in general is a 
good and competent owner, and argues that the criticism against state companies to a 
large degree is based on the ideology of the political right. In addition, the 
Government’s White Paper is criticized for failing to provide a clear political basis 
for assessing and improving state ownership in the future.63  
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*** 
To sum up: The political debate on state ownership is today, as earlier, in good part 
ideologically founded - the differences of opinion seem to follow the demarcation 
line between the political left and the political right. The parties to the right generally 
advocate private ownership on the grounds that state ownership is inefficient, while 
the parties to the left hold a much more positive view on the state’s competence - and 
role - as an industrial owner.  
Thus - although the extreme position of Shleifer and Vishny is absent in the 
Norwegian political debate - there are differing views on whether or not the state 
should act as an industrial owner. However, while the parties to the right are opposed 
to state ownership in principle, we have seen that they admit to a certain practical 
need for such ownership in order to address social concerns. Hence, the matter in 
question in the Norwegian political debate is not if, but to what extent the state 
should act as an owner.  
Another observation about the political debate is that it for a large part lacks 
concrete, empirically substantiated arguments. The fact that it follows traditional 
differences along the political right-left axis, seems to imply that the parties for a 
large part are content with attacking each other’s views, without finding the need to 
substantiate their own arguments to any serious extent. The centre-right 
Government’s claim that state ownership is inefficient is made with reference to the 
agency problem, while the left - represented by the Labour Party - defends the role of 
the state as an industrial owner by simply referring to history. We have seen that the 
Socialist Left party actually upholds that the traditional lines of argumentation 
become less relevant if we take on an innovation perspective. This claim seems, 
however, to be motivated by a wish to undermine the argumentation of the political 
right, rather than being a serious attempt to introduce the issue of innovation into the 
debate on state ownership and corporate governance. Hence, we may conclude that 
the question of how innovation comes about is nearly absent in today’s Norwegian 
political debate on state ownership. Whether this is this the case also in more 
scholarly debate on the issue of corporate governance and state ownership is the 
question we turn to next.  
The academic debate 
 The Norwegian academic debate on state ownership is neither filled with 
controversy nor characterized by fundamental differences in the understanding of 
basic issues. One fundamental issue involved in the debate is constitutional. It 
concerns the principal demarcation lines that are drawn between business and 
politics, and the constitutional need to distinguish between roles and responsibilities 
in the overall social system. Beyond this issue, the academic debate is preoccupied 
with empirical issues, and with reflecting on the state of affairs in Norway in the 
light of economic theory. Many writers point out that there is a need for more 
theoretical and empirical research and for a clarification of types of state 
involvement, as well as a clarification of the diverse motives for state ownership. 
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Bøhren and Ødegaard: The Corporate Governance Project 
The project on corporate governance at the Norwegian School of Management 
headed by Bøhren and Ødegaard, which has been referred to earlier, has a double 
focus. First, it outlines the central characteristics of the ownership structure in 
Norwegian listed firms. Second, these data are used to analyse how ownership 
structure influences economic performance. 
Bøhren and Ødegaard observe how the relationship between corporate governance 
and economic performance has become an active field of research internationally.64 
With regards to the Norwegian debate, they maintain that whereas opinions are 
strong and differing, the knowledge base is limited.65 As to the issue of state 
ownership, they refer to the tendency for the political and popular opinion to be that 
private ownership is more conducive to value creation than state ownership. They 
argue that this opinion is based on the views that the State is a passive owner; that the 
people that represent the State in general lack competence when it comes to running 
businesses. Furthermore, public decision making is too slow; and the State as an 
owner gives preference to political goals rather than business considerations; and it is 
unable to separate clearly its parallel roles as owner and regulator.66 
Although Bøhren and Ødegaard focus upon corporate governance in general, state 
ownership is one of the types of ownership which are analysed. Hence, their work 
does provide valuable inputs to the debate on state ownership.67 Their outline of the 
ownership structure in OSE listed firms shows that state ownership is substantial. 
Against this background Bøhren and Ødegaard raise the question of what happens to 
monitoring quality when managers to a large extent are monitored by civil servants 
rather than by the actual owners.68 They do not try to answer this question, but it is 
quite clear that they are preoccupied with what we have earlier called the agency 
problem: State ownership is perceived by the authors as implying problems with 
regard to efficient control, since the task of disciplining the management is mainly 
placed in the hands of bureaucrats instead of the owners.  
Bøhren and Ødegaard’s work on the relationship between corporate governance and 
economic performance consists in a general analysis on the basis of a wide set of 
ownership variables. One of their findings is central to the debate on state ownership, 
namely that direct ownership is more value creating than indirect ownership.69 They 
write: ‘An agency interpretation of this finding is that with personal owners, the 
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agent is directly monitored by the principal rather than by intermediate agents acting 
on the principal’s behalf.’70 Hence, state ownership - as an example of indirect 
ownership - stands out as relatively unfavourable to value creation due to fact that 
multiple-agent relationships are value-destroying. 
As we see, the agency perspective again appears prominent. Also, the writers uphold 
that ‘As far back as 225 years ago Adam Smith maintained that human nature is so 
frail that most people administer their own money better than others.’71 However, 
Bøhren and Ødegaard do not adopt the arguments of the maximizing shareholder 
value model uncritically. They point out that indirect owners can compensate for 
their lack of control incentives by being more competent owners than personal 
investors - at least ‘In theory, the incentive-disadvantages of indirect ownership can 
be more than equalized by a higher degree of professionalism and better access to 
information.’72 Also, they stress that there may be benefits to indirect ownership 
which are not captured by the maximizing shareholder value model nor by their own 
analysis. These arguments are, however, introduced with reference to institutional 
and industrial ownership, not state ownership.73  
To conclude: Although not uncritical promoters of the maximizing shareholder value 
model, Bøhren and Ødegaard can be said to represent this tradition in that it seems to 
be their dominant theoretical point of orientation. Against this background, their 
opinion on indirect - and hence state - ownership seems to be that it is less conducive 
to value creation than private ownership, but that this problem can be addressed by 
making sure the monitoring agents have the incentives to act in accordance with the 
interests of the owners.74 
Byrkjeland and Langeland 
In addition to outlining the historical development of state ownership in Norway, 
Martin Byrkjeland and Ove Langeland in their aforementioned FAFO working paper 
bring attention to the nature of state ownership more generally. They also discuss 
both the justification of the State acting as an owner and the challenges relating to the 
organization and administration of state companies. 
The question of whether state ownership can be justified is related to the issues of 
efficiency and legitimacy. Byrkjeland and Langeland go far in questioning the 
efficiency of state companies. They refer to recent international research indicating 
that private ownership is more efficient than state ownership when it comes to both 
product development and productivity.75 According to Langeland and Byrkjeland, 
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several idiosyncrasies applying to state ownership set limits to its efficiency. For one 
thing, the State is a complex owner. It is made up of several political and 
administrative actors with varying - and in some cases conflicting - interests and 
goals. The fact that state companies are to operate according to social as well as 
economic goals obviously only deepens this complexity. Another point is that the 
distance between owner and management is particularly long in state companies. 
Between the owner - the Norwegian people - and the management, stand Parliament, 
the Government, the responsible Minister, and the company board. This fragmented 
control structure accentuates the agency problem according to the two authors. This 
problem is made even more pressing by the fact that state companies lack several of 
the mechanisms for disciplining management which are available to private firms.76 
In addition, there are problems related to the efficiency of the company board as a 
disciplining mechanism. These problems have to do with the facts that the board is to 
address both political and economic goals, and that there exists no formal 
instructions as to its functions. Hence, the responsibilities of the board are often 
unclear.77 In questioning the efficiency of state companies, Byrkjeland and Langeland 
make the same point as Shleifer and Vishny - that the bureaucrats who run these 
companies may be more concerned with their own political interests than with 
economic efficiency.78  
To Byrkjeland and Langeland, the inefficiency of state companies is in itself a 
challenge to the legitimacy of state ownership.79 The question of legitimacy is made 
even more pressing by the State’s parallel functions as owner and regulator. The fact 
that the State both owns, and decides upon the general terms for, industrial enterprise 
raises doubts as to the fairness of competition. In Byrkjeland and Langeland’s view 
the State’s main role is to be a regulator, not an owner. They stress that the need to 
secure social goals, which is frequently used to justify the State’s role as an industrial 
owner, can be addressed in other ways than through ownership - for instance through 
regulations, concessions, and commission financing.80 
Byrkjeland and Langeland do however accept the argument that the removal of trade 
barriers and the deregulation of capital markets we see today reduce the efficiency of 
regulations and accentuate the need for control through ownership. This holds 
especially true when it comes to securing national ownership. In this connection, 
Byrkjeland and Langeland maintain that ‘If we accept the argument that industrial 
activity is not only affected by the general rationality of the market, but also by 
institutional and cultural factors which must be seen in the context of states and 
nations, the need for control can still be a central argument in favour of state 
ownership of key enterprises.’81  
In addition to acknowledging a certain need for state ownership, the authors stress 
that the tendency for state companies to be associated with unsuccessful investments, 
low profits, etc. can not be ascribed to their inefficiency alone. It must also be 
understood in the context of the facts that state companies are particularly exposed to 
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public attention; that there is generally more focus on failure than on success; and 
that state companies in general are large and hence exposed to high risk. Byrkjeland 
and Langeland also argue that aspects of state ownership which are commonly 
perceived to be negative may not be so if we take on a long term perspective. They 
question whether the general tendency for state companies to react slowly to external 
conditions is exclusively negative. They refer to Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk as a point 
in matter. Although the economic performance of this company was poor, and 
extraordinary state support was called for on several occasions, it may appear that the 
long term competence building which took place may have been crucial to the 
activities of Kongsberg Gruppen today.82 
In so far as the State should act as an industrial owner, Byrkjeland and Langeland 
point to several challenges relating to how state ownership should be organized and 
administered. Important challenges relate to the balancing on the one hand of 
political and economic goals, and on the other hand of the State’s parallel functions 
as owner and regulator. The trend goes in the direction of state companies being run 
more professionally and according to business considerations, and of establishing 
institutional divisions between the roles of owner and regulator.83 The authors state 
that ‘Professionalization […] and increased focus on profits may reduce problems 
relating to state ownership, but will not eliminate them. The State will in the last 
resort always be a political, not an economic owner. Business considerations must 
always be weighed against political goals.’84 They also argue that a reduction in the 
State’s decision making powers raises the question of why the State should act as an 
owner in the first place. As mentioned earlier, Byrkjeland and Langeland maintain 
that the State’s main role is to be a regulator. Therefore, they argue that the question 
of how the State can control private firms through regulations will become 
increasingly important in the future.85 
To sum up: Byrkjeland and Langeland have respect for institutional arguments, and 
consider the regulatory role of the State as its primary role. They are worried about 
the intrinsic problems of state ownership, and question to what extent such 
ownership can become effective given the actual structure and mode of functioning 
that prevails in the State. The authors do not, however, follow Shleifer and Vishny in 
their total disregard for a possible upside. In particular, they keep the door open for 
the possibility that economic agents are not free from nationalistic bias and cultural 
specificities, and point out that in a globalising economy, state ownership is one of 
the few means of national control that remains. Also, they stress that state ownership 
may be conducive to long term competence building, and hence to value creation 
over time. 
Statskonsult  
While Byrkjeland and Langeland address the question of whether or not the State 
should act as an owner, the before mentioned 1998 Statskonsult report concentrates 
on how state ownership de facto is organized and administered. The report is based 
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on a study of nineteen companies in which the state is owner, comprising the three 
different organizational forms state companies,86 state enterprises, and special-law 
firms. The central issues are how governance is influenced by organization and how 
the State actually approaches the issue of governance within its holdings. In 
conclusion, the report presents a set of recommendations for the organization and 
administration of state companies in the future. 
  
One conclusion in the report is that the choice between the respective organizational 
forms is not consistent with existing political guidelines.87 According to these 
guidelines, the special-law firm alternative should be excluded, since the objectives 
of such firms may just as well be addressed by state enterprises. The choice between 
the state company form and the state enterprise form should be based on the relative 
importance of business and politics respectively. While the company form should be 
preferred when the main objective of the State is to engage in business, the enterprise 
form should be chosen when state ownership to a substantial degree is also seen as an 
instrument for achieving sectoral policy goals.88 The study shows that the special-law 
firm form is still being used and that the choice between the other two organizational 
forms seems to be coincidental.89  
Also, the report states that organizational form in practice is of little importance to 
how the State exerts ownership control. There are few variations in governance 
between the different organizational forms. The variations in governance that do 
occur tend to be related to distinctive features of the individual firms, rather than to 
organization. All in all, the report identifies a general approach by the state with 
regards to the governance of its holding. For one thing, the State is said to exert 
ownership control through the formal channels of the companies. It is argued that the 
responsible Ministers are very anxious to follow the explicit, formal ‘rules of the 
game’. Secondly, it is maintained that the State chooses to be a passive owner. The 
contact between the companies and the responsible Ministers tends to be limited - 
and usually initiated by the company management or board. Also, the Ministers 
rarely exert control through general meetings. This is true even for companies which 
play an important socio-political role.90 As possible reasons for the formal and 
passive role played by the State, Statskonsult suggests that it lacks substantial 
experience with controlling companies, and is afraid to transmit the governance 
structure of administrative agencies to state companies; that the State’s competence 
regarding the activities of the companies is limited, and that it therefore chooses to 
place the main responsibility for the running of the companies in the hands of the 
boards; and that the relationship between the State and the company boards is 
characterized by mutual trust, and that conflicts seldom arise because the company 
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listens to political signals, and there is a mutual understanding of the needs of the 
companies.91 
A general conclusion in Statskonsult’s report is that the State - through the 
government Ministers - pays little attention to formal guidelines when choosing the 
organizational form for its holdings, while it is very anxious to follow formal rules 
when it comes to exerting ownership control.92 Based on its findings, Statskonsult 
presents a set of recommendations. First, it is argued that the existing political 
guidelines for the choice between organizational forms should be upheld and 
clarified, and that the guidelines should be followed to a larger degree than they are 
today. In this connection, Statskonsult maintains that the State should also consider 
alternative ways of addressing socio-political goals than through ownership. 
Secondly, the need to improve state ownership is stressed. One point in matter is that 
the State should provide the company boards with clear instructions, in order to 
clarify the boards’ responsibilities vis-à-vis the owner as well as the management. A 
third and related recommendation, is that the State’s competence regarding corporate 
governance should be improved. One suggestion in this direction is the establishment 
of an inter-ministerial forum for the exchange of experience and advice, and the 
preparation of an instruction book on corporate governance in state companies.93 
Conference on ownership and power, The research project Power and 
Democracy 
In a similar vein as Statskonsult, the historian Tore Grønlie has over several years 
studied how governance in state companies de facto is practiced. In the particular 
article we base the present analysis on, he expresses no opinion on whether the State 
should act as an owner. However, based on his historical studies of the post war 
period he disagrees with Statskonsult’s conclusion that political control tends to be 
exerted through formal channels. The cited article, where Grønlie makes this point, 
was published in a report from the conference on ownership and power, which was 
arranged in connection with the on-going research project Power and Democracy - 
Makt- og demokratiutredningen - in 1999. 94 State ownership was one of three main 
issues that were addressed at the conference. The focus upon state ownership was 
explained with reference to the State’s role as the largest individual owner in 
Norwegian industry and to the fact that it has become increasingly common to 
question the justification of state ownership.95 In addition to Grønlie, Per Tore Woie 
and Rune Slagstad participated in the session on state ownership. Woie was at the 
time Parliamentary Secretary in the first Bondevik centre-coalition government, and 
his views are well covered in our discussion of the current centre-right coalition that 
was presented earlier. Rune Slagstad’s views on state ownership are discussed below. 
The central question in Grønlie’s article is who controls state companies? His point 
of departure is the set of principles which are generally upheld as guidelines for the 
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balancing of business and politics in state companies. These principles include, 
firstly, the separation of business issues from overriding strategic issues. While 
business issues are to be the sole responsibility of the company, strategic issues both 
can and should be subjected to political control. Secondly, the right to give political 
instruction is to lie with the responsible Minister. Other political actors - such as 
Parliament - are to act through him. The third principle is that political control is to 
be exerted through the company’s formal channels for decision making - primarily 
the board or the general meeting.96  
Grønlie’s main argument is that these guidelines are not followed in practice. 
Although focusing on state companies 97 - which are commonly considered to be the 
organizational form with the clearest division lines between business and politics - 
Grønlie maintains that his line of reasoning applies to state enterprises and special-
law firms as well. He argues that history has shown that it is difficult to draw up 
clear dividing lines between business and politics. Based on his historical studies, he 
points to two general features of the governance of state companies: The first being 
that strategic political control tends to be limited; the second that political control 
rarely is exerted through the companies’ formal channels for decision-making.98 
According to Grønlie, the State limits its interference in state companies. When 
political control is exerted, it is in most cases a response to media attention, 
economic crises, the need for readjustment, political opportunism, etc.99 In 
accordance with Statskonsult’s conclusions, he points out that neither historically nor 
presently has the general meeting been used as an active control instrument by the 
State.100 This is also said to be true when it comes to the company board. Similarly to 
Statskonsult, Grønlie stresses that there exists no formal political instruction for the 
boards. Neither is there any overriding, explicit policy behind the appointment of 
board members. Hence, Grønlie argues that the board profile is at any point in time 
determined by the composition of board members. He states that the boards have had 
different profiles over time. The typical state company board of today is 
characterized as a professional board, in which business considerations are the centre 
of attention and political interference is not wished for.101 In Grønlie’s opinion, the 
limited political interference must also be seen in connection with the general 
aspirations of the management of state companies to act as independently as possible. 
The managers’ main focus is upon business considerations rather than upon socio-
political goals. In addition, Grønlie argues that management is generally ready to 
enter into conflicts with the State in order to defend its freedom of action and to 
secure future profits. Management is however said to readily embrace the benefits of 
being owned by the State, such as access to public funds and safety, and to exert 
political pressure whenever this is in the interest of the company.102 
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Grønlie’s other point is that political control rarely is exerted through formal 
channels. Instead of being channelled through the responsible Minister, control is 
exerted by various political actors in several different ways. Grønlie also maintains 
that the Ministers themselves - at least at certain times and in certain companies - 
give strong control signals through informal rather than formal channels. This is said 
to indicate that Ministers want to exercise control, but that they are reluctant to 
accept the responsibilities that go along with it. While stating that these arguments 
are based on historical studies, Grønlie is of the opinion that informal political 
control is common even today. Hence, he questions the conclusion of Statskonsult’s 
study and argues that the empirical basis of this study is not suitable for drawing any 
conclusions as to the extent of informal control practices.103 
While stressing that political control in general is limited, Grønlie argues that 
Parliament plays an active role in the control of state companies today. Parliament 
exerts control vis-à-vis the companies by defining frameworks within which 
economic action must take place. Also, parliamentary control is backed up by 
increased inspection of state companies by the Public Accounts Committee. 104 
However, Grønlie points out that parliamentary control is not exerted according to 
any general principles or strategies, but rather opportunistically and in an ad hoc 
way. Neither is it always channelled through the responsible Minister.105  
Against the background of these trends, Grønlie argues that there is no unitary 
governance system when it comes to state companies, but rather a multi-centred 
system in which different actors try to influence the running of the companies 
according to their own particular interests at a particular time.106 Who then, control 
the state companies? Since the control system is so fragmented, with different actors 
trying to exert control according to their specific interests at any time, he maintains 
that the balance of power between the different actors becomes the central issue. He 
states that ‘It is hardly possible to name one winner - or a governor of governors - in 
this play for power. In spite of all weaknesses, the play have a kind of ”equilibrium” 
built into it, based on the institutional logic that is represented, and the position of the 
representative herself. In this fashion, the governing of state companies is a natural 
extension - or reflexion - of ”democracy the Norwegian way”.’107 Grønlie does 
however point to two - opposite - trends, which in a fundamental way may have 
changed the balance of power. First, there has been an increase in parliamentary 
control. Secondly, ministerial control has decreased. Against this background, 
Grønlie suggests two ‘winners’ when it comes to who is controlling the state 
companies: The companies and Parliament. He does however raise the question 
whether parliamentary control actually affects the big and important issues - and 
states that if not, this leaves the companies as the overall winner.108 
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In conclusion, Grønlie states that most will agree that there are problems related to 
the governance of state companies: There is a general absence of strategic control, 
and the degree of formal decision making is too low.109 He also stresses the need for a 
more thorough debate over - and a clarification of - the objectives of state ownership 
in Norway. He predicts that we will continue to have relatively extensive state 
ownership, because there is a wide-held - albeit not necessarily well reflected - belief 
in state ownership as the best way of securing socio-political goals. As to the trend 
towards part privatization, which is upheld as an ideal way of balancing the interests 
of politics and business, Grønlie points out that the problems associated with reduced 
state control are not discussed. In a governance perspective, he believes part 
privatization is even more problematic than full privatization. While stressing that he 
as a researcher has no opinion of whether the part privatization process should be 
continued, he calls for increased discussion of the different organizational and 
governance forms of state enterprises. In his concluding remarks, Grønlie also 
expresses the opinion that the running of state companies should be the concern of 
politicians, and that we should look for improved ways of balancing business and 
politics in these companies.110   
Like Grønlie, Rune Slagstad takes a historical approach to the question of state 
ownership in Norway. To him, our historical experience is a strong argument in 
favour of a continued central role for the state as an industrial owner. Slagstad 
maintains that the State has played a crucial role in Norwegian economic 
development in the last 150 years. Even in the middle of the nineteenth century, 
when economic liberalism was at its peak, the State was ascribed a central role in 
initiating and organizing economic activities. In addition to Norway’s lack of a 
financially strong middle class and the country’s underdeveloped commercial 
banking system, Slagstad explains this with reference to the existence of a strategic 
milieu which upheld the idea of a planned liberalism.111 Fredrik Stang and A.M. 
Schweigaard were central actors in this milieu, which according to Slagstad - with 
reference to the words of Schweigaard - believed that ‘The short-term and 
changeable nature of individual interests ascribes to the state the role of conductor: 
To unite separate forces and bring them into co-operation.’112 
Slagstad stresses that Stang and Schweigaard held a pragmatic view on proprietory 
rights, which was still dominant at the beginning of the twentieth century when 
Norway experienced its industrial break-through. This view was that proprietory 
rights were to serve social goals. As an ample practical expression of this view, 
Slagstad points to the Concession Laws of the early decades of the twentieth 
century.113 In the post-war period, the emphasis upon the social functions of 
proprietory rights was upheld by the Labour Party in its undertaking to modernize the 
country through promoting and combining economic and social development. 
Although the Labour Party was the central actor in this modernization process, 
Slagstad argues that it was rooted in a broader strategic milieu which consisted of 
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politicians belonging to different political parties, as well as industrialists and 
scientist.114 
Against this background, Slagstad turns to the developments of the 1980s and 1990s. 
In his words, these last two decades have seen ‘a remarkable change in mentality’: 
Private property is viewed as sacred and state industrial involvement as unnatural 
and unwanted. Slagstad accuses the advocates of this view of being ignorant of 
Norwegian history, which shows that the country’s economic development and 
growth in the last 150 years to a large degree has been facilitated by a strong and 
active state.115 In his opinion, Schweigaard’s argument that state industrial 
involvement is necessary to secure strategic long term control of the economy is still 
valid. Slagstad’s main point, however, is that we need a strategic milieu - similar to 
the one’s we have seen in earlier times - for continually discussing and developing 
the strategic foundations for the development of Norwegian industry and society at 
large.116 
*** 
In conclusion, we note that the academic debate on state ownership in Norway 
follows many of the same lines as the political debate. None of the contributions we 
have surveyed repudiates state ownership altogether, in the way of Shleifer and 
Vishny. As in the political debate, there seem to be agreement that state ownership is 
needed in order to address social goals. There is, however, disagreement with regards 
to the efficiency of state ownership, and hence how extensive it should be. As we 
have seen, both Bøhren and Ødegaard and Byrkjeland and Langeland go far in 
questioning the efficiency of state companies. Their theoretical basis for doing so is 
the agency problem, and they also share Shleifer and Vishny’s scepticism as to the 
ability of bureaucrats to run businesses effectively. In the other end of the spectrum 
of the academic debate, we find Rune Slagstad who - in the same manner as the 
Labour Party - argues in favour of state industrial ownership on the basis of 
Norway’s historical experience. We have also seen - i.a. through the contributions by 
Statskonsult and Grønlie - that the debate partly revolves around the questions of 
how state ownership is and should be organized. The issue of how innovation relates 
to governance and economic performance is, however, absent - as it is in the political 
debate.  
In the next section, we attempt to show how an innovation perspective may enrich 
the Norwegian debate on state ownership. 
                                                 
114
 Ibid., pp. 99-100 
115
 Ibid., pp. 98-102 
116
 Ibid., pp. 103-105 
 31 
4. Concluding notes on governance, state ownership 
and innovation 
State ownership in the Norwegian governance debate 
The international debate on corporate governance has two major weaknesses. First, 
with some notable exceptions,117 the debate has a narrow concept of what a firm is; 
namely a rational actor with qualities making it substantially very similar to the 
individual conceptualized by mainstream economists as economic man. The 
launching pin of the governance debate then becomes the troubling realization that in 
economies where firms have their ownership split off from the management function, 
the simple, unitary and rationalistic economic model of the firm becomes 
unconvincing (even to economists themselves). If owners and managers are not the 
same people, it is not obvious that firms act as profit maximizers even though the 
owners themselves strive to maximize profits and try to induce managers to do the 
same, on their behalf. The debate which springs from such considerations are, as we 
have explained earlier, crucially concerned with this agency problem, and some of 
the normative governance analyses addressing this issue articulate what we have 
called the maximizing shareholder value model.  
Second, the debate is marked by the fact that ownership in many contexts is treated 
as synonymous with private ownership. It is as if the ownership by individuals is 
considered the most basic and natural form of ownership, while institutional 
ownership is some kind of aberration from the normal and natural. As we have 
mentioned earlier, state companies are in general ignored in the international 
corporate governance debate.118 In the Shleifer and Vishny case state ownership is 
taken into consideration, but the assessment of its significance is somewhat 
superficial, and especially lacking in historical context.119 
In several countries - and as we have seen, also in Norway - state ownership is a 
salient feature in industry. This fact is recognized in the Norwegian governance 
debate. Our general finding is that the Norwegian debate is oriented towards two 
distinct foci: The first is the specific performance effects of state ownership. The 
second is the institutional issues related to the dual role of the State as business 
owner and regulator, and the various specific forms of state ownership that has been 
developed over time.  
Also in the Norwegian debate it appears to be the rule rather than the exception that 
the underlying conceptual basis is strongly influenced by equilibrium oriented 
neoclassical economic thinking. And it is the agency problem and the maximizing 
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shareholder value model that is the conceptual backdrop when efficiency of state 
owned firms is discussed. This applies as much to the political rhetoric as it applies 
to the more scholarly debate. 
In spite of this, we do find that the Norwegian debate is much more nuanced with 
respect to state ownership than the international debate, at least as this international 
debate is assessed by Shleifer and Vishny. There is a remarkably broad consensus 
that state ownership plays a significant and positive role in a small country such as 
Norway. Furthermore, there is broad agreement that globalization serves to deepen 
the relevance of this positive function of state ownership, rather than to weaken it. 
The overall impression is that we are confronted with a debate on state ownership 
and corporate governance being marked by a significant level of consensus, while 
lacking somewhat in consistency. We find that people agree both that state 
ownership is positive and necessary - and that it is problematic and should be 
avoided. The positive aspect of ownership is understood in strategic and pragmatic 
terms as a consequence of a distorted market; of market imperfections. The 
benchmarking of state ownership, thus, is done by contrasting the real world 
situation with the idealized image of a free market economy in its equilibrium state.  
Even those who are not interested in economics per se, but who are concerned with 
state ownership as a deviation from sound norms of power sharing among key 
institutions in society, tend to share the idea that such ownership is an aberration 
from a pure and well functioning liberal capitalist system. Rune Slagstad criticizes 
this, as he points out that utopian liberalism has very little to do with the real issues 
and the real driving forces in modern economies. He is interested in state ownership 
as he sees this as but one expression of the fundamental fact that development 
historically has been driven by interactions and alliances that do not fit with utopian 
liberal ideas about economic and social life. Norway, and not least its industry, has 
been built to a very large extent on alliances between leaders in the political, 
economic and scientific spheres. In his view, the strategic efforts to build Norwegian 
society for fundamental reasons transgress the analytical distinctions that are drawn 
between the ‘politics’, ‘business’ and ‘academia’. Developments disobey these 
analytical distinctions not because of ‘perversions’ of the functioning of society, but 
precisely because the distinctions made are unrealistic and unsuited to perform a 
penetrating analysis of social and economic change.120 
State ownership in a systems oriented innovation perspective 
The direction that Slagstad’s argument points towards is in our view where analyses 
of the significance of state ownership in systems oriented innovation theory bring us. 
  
Benchmarking state involvement in the economy against utopian ideals of pure, 
liberal societies, or pure market economies in an equilibrium state, are not at all 
pregnant strategies to understand the real significance of state ownership in the 
economy. Innovation is the fundamental force of development of business and 
industry. In a meaningful debate on corporate governance and state ownership, it is 
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essential to look into the significance of ownership with respect to innovation. The 
specificities of innovation efforts as economic, administrative and professional 
endeavours must be taken into consideration, and the potential of state ownership as 
a means to foster business and industry highlighted. 
For obvious reasons, we cannot here actually venture far into modern innovation 
theory and develop a well founded stance on the potential of state ownership on this 
basis. What we do want to show, however, is that it is essential to develop such 
arguments and to bring them into the state ownership and governance debate.  
Stated succinctly, the fundamental shift that is required in the debate on state 
ownership and governance consists in a shift of attention; from an analysis of the 
system of production to a concern with the system of innovation. Instead of thinking 
in static terms, dynamics have to be highlighted. For example: While the 
performance of production systems may be properly evaluated in terms of input, 
output and time (addressing issues such as how much resources are consumed, how 
much produce generated, how much time this takes, and how predictable the 
processes are), this is less relevant for the assessment of performance of innovation 
systems.  
The reason for this is simple to state, but the consequences more complex and 
unclear: Innovation is not only about producing, it is about transforming. Innovation 
basically consists in creating something new, and therefore obviously involves 
learning.  However, ‘the creation of something new’ is a more complex object of 
study than one might expect. For one, creation is linked with destruction. Part and 
parcel with making something new is the destruction of something else. What is 
destroyed may be unimportant and inconsequential, as when the production line for 
one type of product is dismantled and a new production line set up. However, when 
innovation is radical it may destroy things that many find valuable and worth 
conserving. This, to mention but one example, happened when computer based 
layout and printing systems replaced conventional page setting and printing 
technologies.  
A second feature of innovation that is contributing to making it a complex object of 
study, is that creating something new not only concerns materials and artefacts, but 
also cognition, meaning and - in a deep sense - politics. What is created has to be 
created as meaningful objects to significant others, and this makes innovation as 
much a social venture as a technical venture.121  
The term heterogeneous network building has been coined to capture this essential 
trait of innovation processes,122 and this concept can help us to see that the machine 
metaphor is much less relevant in the case of innovation systems than it is when it 
comes to grasping the logic of - and measuring the performance of - systems of 
production. Predictable processes and perfected routines are much less central as 
determinants of innovation; the creative ability to construct new things, and to 
convince others about their viability and usefulness certainly depends on skills and 
competence, but requires more than optimization of already established practices. 
                                                 
121
 These issues have been discussed more fully in Ørstavik, Finn, The hierarchical systems paradigm 
in technological innovation, Dr. Philos thesis, Oslo: The University of Oslo, 1996. 
122
 See for instance Latour, Bruno, Science in action, How to follow scientists and 
engineers through society, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1987 
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A key element of innovation, then, is the ability to invest: To commit resources to 
projects aimed at changing the ways the firm is doing its business in the future. This 
task is a difficult challenge for any organisation. It is widely recognised that 
investing for the future involves a conflict between present and future returns. Of 
course, any firm must not only invest for the future, but must make profits today, and 
there are necessarily conflicts over this.  
Two further characteristics of innovation processes exacerbate problems in longer-
term investment behaviour. One is the fact that innovation capabilities tend to be 
cumulative over time, and path-dependent. The second is uncertainty. Uncertainty in 
innovation processes is rarely a matter of risk assessment - that is, it is often not a 
matter of assigning a probability to some outcome. Rather, it is a more fundamental 
matter of not knowing what types of technological development paths may be those 
prevailing: What rival firms will be doing, what customers will want to adopt, and 
what regulatory authorities will do with issues of relevance for new business 
ventures, are all significant unknowns. Seen in this perspective, the management of 
innovation is primarily a matter of coping with uncertainty, and much depends on the 
extent to which firms can handle this uncertainty, and what they can do in order to 
reduce it.  
In all these respects there is a link between the nature of the governance system (in 
the firm as well as in the economy), and the innovation efforts and investment 
decisions related to innovation. The governance system affects both the incentives 
and opportunities firms have to invest in innovation, as well as the opportunities 
firms have to reduce uncertainty related to the development paths that are selected.  
State ownership takes on a new significance in this perspective. Such ownership 
directly influences the ability of firms to defer making profits, and thus their stamina 
with respect to carrying out demanding innovation efforts that span long periods of 
time. State ownership also opens up the firm and innovative strategies to reflect other 
priorities than those that would be most important under other circumstances. But 
beyond this, state ownership may open up completely new possibilities to reduce the 
fundamental uncertainty that is faced by innovators. What private firms may achieve 
by making strategic alliances with other important firms in terms of agreements on 
future development directions may not necessarily be easily matched by way of 
public ownership. Such alliances are extremely important in any innovative industry, 
as they reduce uncertainty and improve chances of innovative success. On the other 
hand, those regulatory uncertainties stemming from what private firms often see as 
an unpredictable and unmanageable public policy system may be alleviated by 
linking the firm into the system of government by way of direct ownership. 
In an innovation oriented systems perspective, the role of state ownership takes on 
new significance because the role of the state as partner in creating and facilitating 
change is brought into the open. In infrastructure related industries such as 
telecommunications, this is maybe most readily apparent. But in all cases where 
businesses innovate, regulatory conditions are involved, and the state must play a 
role, facilitating, inhibiting and giving specific direction to change. 
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Epilogue 
Under the leadership of individuals like Jens Chr. Hauge and Finn Lied, and with 
support from Labour Party leaders such as Einar Gerhardsen and Håkon Lie, 
Kongsberg in the period 1955 – 1975 was developed from an outdated and shattered 
post war armament producer, into a powerhouse of engineering competence 
producing advanced technology products such as the weapon systems Penguin, 
digital computers, and turbines. The concerted efforts of people in the policy system, 
in industry and in research laid the basis for a new industrial production and 
innovation system which generated products that it was possible to sell in 
competitive international markets. The firm, however, failed to generate sufficient 
income to secure net profitability of its operations. Ambitious innovation projects 
were established and the hope was always that these would eventually lead to 
commercial success. The state involvement in Kongsberg was significantly reduced 
and the firm was forced into bankruptcy in the 1980ies. Private investors bought into 
the firm, while the State continued to be a significant owner. As a result of increased 
private ownership, management changes and refocused strategies, the firm has 
managed to run a profitable business after these events. Popular opinion may be that 
this proves the impotence of the state as owner, and the need for the state to abstain 
from running businesses, and focus on playing a regulatory role. In reality, however, 
the success of KV over the last 20 years cannot be understood independently of the 
large scale strategic investments going on before 1980. Also, the performance of the 
firm in the years after cannot be seen as a result of laissez-faire as far as the 
Norwegian State is concerned. Politics and economics continue to be intermingled at 
Kongsberg, and the track record and future of the company is linked intimately to the 
ability of key people and institutions to interact constructively in the efforts to 
develop industry in Kongsberg to a vital knowledge intensive industrial cluster. 
* * * 
In the fish farming industry today, private interests are dominating. After Norsk 
Hydro’s exit from this industry, some of the largest firms show an almost exclusive 
preoccupation with short term profits. The idea has been to build economies of scale 
through mergers and acquisitions, but the logic of operations seems not to have 
changed significantly as the size of the overall operations has grown. In spite of 
attempts to build efficiency and market clout on the basis of production volume, it 
has proven to be impossible to make sufficient profits to finance the growth.  
The reality is that core fish farming activities today are run in a way that reflect an 
overriding concern with simple price competition, and a lack of understanding of the 
role of innovation as a fundamental driving force in the industry. The focus is on cost 
cutting and realizing economies of scale through volume growth, while the need for 
innovation and the opportunity to develop competitive clout by transforming current 
products, operations and markets, tend to be overlooked. The need for cross-linking 
the various activities in the value chain and for developing common strategies for 
long term industry transformative growth is more or less ignored. The industry in 
this way ignores opportunities to build a potent innovation system, where research, 
market development, product diversification and production optimization are 
integrated into a functioning whole.         
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